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L 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-2-801(6) (1996) and §63-46b-16(1993). 
n. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Did the Labor Commission err in ruling that Sonni Schwinn failed to prove the existence 
of extraordinary mental stress? 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The Facts Are Not Disputed: Appellant Schwinn has accepted the 
findings of fact set forth in the ALJ's decision and ratified by the Labor Commission's decision 
(Attached as Appendix A), based upon a failure to challenge these facts in her brief and failure to 
marshal the evidence. The Commission's finding of fact are conclusive in this matter. 
2. Sole Issue On Appeal: The Commission concluded that Schwinn did not 
prove the existence of extreme mental stress as required by § 34-A-3-106(2)(a) and (b). This is a 
mixed question of law and fact. 
In Caporoz v. Labor Comm'n. 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah App. 1997), this Court 
noted that the Commission has been granted, through explicit legislation, broad discretion to 
determine the facts and apply the law. Based on the dates of injury alleged, Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-16(1) (1994)(repealed effective July 1, 1997) applies to this case. This section provides: 
The commission has the duty and full power, jurisdiction, 
and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in 
this or any other title or chapter that it administers. 
(Emphasis added). 
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Based upon the foregoing, this Court should review the Commission's determination that 
Schwinn did not prove the existence of extreme mental stress under a "reasonableness" standard 
of review. See Morton Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Common. 814 P.2d 581, 587 
(Utah 1991)("[A]n agency has abused its discretion when the agency's action, viewed in the 
context of the language and purpose of the governing statute, is unreasonable."). This Court 
should grant great deference to an agency's findings, and will uphold them if they are "supported 
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Department 
of Air Force v. S wider. 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah App. 1991). 
in. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
See Appendix B for the complete text; pertinent section is reproduced below: 
(4)The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by the 
following: 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by 
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16. Powers and duties of commission - Fees. (Repealed) 
See Appendix B for the complete text pertinent section is reproduced below: 
(1) The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to 
determine the facts and apply the law in this or any other title or chapter that it administers. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-106. Mental stress claims [formerly known as § 35-2-104 
Renumbered effective July 1,1997], 
(1) Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to mental stress arising out of an in 
the course of employment shall be compensable under this chapter only when there is a sufficient 
legal and medical causal connection between the employee's disease and the employment. 
(2) (a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary mental stress arising 
predominantly and directly from employment. 
(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental stress is judged according to an 
objective standard in comparison with contemporary national employment and nonemployment 
life. 
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, mental, or emotional disease was 
medically caused by the mental stress that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or emotional 
disease. 
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including disciplinary actions, work 
evaluations, job transfers, layoffs, demotions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not 
form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter. 
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor practices otherwise actionable at 
law may not form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter. 
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable occupational disease involving mental 
stress bears the burden of proof to establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
IV. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, respondents request that 
oral argument be held. 
v 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Sonni Schwinn appeals from an Order Denying Motion for Review dated April 6, 1998 in 
which the Labor Commission of Utah concluded that Schwinn failed to prove the existence of 
extraordinary mental distress as defined and required by § 34A-3-106 of the Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. The issue in this case is whether the Commission erred in concluding that Schwinn 
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failed to prove extraordinary mental distress caused by her work environment at Human Affairs 
International ("HAI"). 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
On December 11, 1996, Schwinn filed an Occupational Disease Claim alleging that the 
working conditions she encountered at HAI led to mental and physical injuries. In their Answer, 
HAI affirmatively alleged that the applicant could not prove that her alleged occupational 
exposure was caused by extraordinary mental stress arising predominantly and directly from the 
employment. HAI also affirmatively alleged that applicant's alleged industrial exposure was not 
compensable as the exposure was based upon good faith employer personnel actions and her 
claims were otherwise actionable at law. An evidentiary hearing consisting of two and one-half 
days took place between June 27, 1997 and June 30, 1997. 
On December 12, 1997, the administrative law judge issued Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order. Schwinn filed an undated Motion for Review which was 
received by respondent's on January 9, 1998. The Motion did not state the grounds for review. 
Respondent's filed a Memorandum in Response to Motion for Review and Cross-Motion for 
Review contending that the administrative law judge should have also denied Schwinn's claims 
for benefits based on evidence that the alleged mental stress claims were based on good faith 
employer actions and that she had claims of alleged employer discrimination which were 
otherwise actionable at law. 
On or about January 22, 1998 Ms. Schwinn filed a Written Response to Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. On January 27, 1998 Schwinn filed an Addendum to Written 
Response. On February 4, 1998 Respondent's filed a Motion to Strike. On February 6, 1998 
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Schwinn filed her Objections to Respondents' Motion to Strike. 
C. Disposition by the Labor Commission 
The Labor Commission, on April 6, 1998, entered an Order denying Schwinn's Motion 
for Review. The Commission held that Schwinn failed to prove the existence of extraordinary 
mental stress as defined and required by § 34A-3-106 of the Utah Occupational Disease Act. R 
at 1066. The Commission carefully considered the facts of Schwinn's work at HAI and judged 
the events and circumstances of the employment relationship against the objective standards of 
modern employment and nonemployment and found that the objective facts of her employment 
do not support any basis to conclude that her work created extraordinary stress. Id. In fact, the 
Commission specifically found that the events and circumstances of Schwinn's work were 
relatively typical of the frictions, difficulties and personal conflicts that may arise in an 
employment setting that brings people together. Id. On May 8, 1998, more than thirty days after 
her Motion for Review was denied, Schwinn filed an Appeal with the Supreme Court of Utah. 
On June 8, 1998 Respondent's filed a Motion to Transfer the appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
VL 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Respondents adopt the administrative law judge's Statement Findings of Fact as 
its own. (Record ("R"). at 938-946). See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
attached as Appendix "A." 
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vn. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Labor Commission correctly concluded that Schwinn did not prove the existence of 
extraordinary mental distress arising predominantly and directly from her employment with HAL 
Under the Utah Occupational Disease Act, in order to recover benefits, an employee must have 
suffered physical, mental, or emotional diseases arising out of and in the course of her 
employment. In order to meet this requirement, Schwinn must prove the existence of 
extraordinary mental stress by a preponderance of the evidence. Here, Schwinn's alleged 
physical, mental and/or emotional disease did not arise out of and in the course of her 
employment. Rather, the uncontroverted evidence shows that Schwinn's work environment at 
HAI, when judged according to an objective standard in comparison with contemporary national 
employment and nonemployment life, was relatively typical. 
Schwinn is required to marshal all of the evidence and show that the ALJ's Findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence. Schwinn has failed to do anything more than to set forth 
those facts which she contends support her claims for benefits. Schwinn's failure to marshal the 
evidence should result in the court's declining to overturn the ALJ's findings. 
For the reason stated above and the analysis below, this court should affirm the Labor 
Commission's decision, holding that Schwinn failed to prove the existence of extraordinary 
mental stress arising predominately and directly from her employment with HAI and that she 
failed to marshal the evidence necessary to overturn the ALJ's findings. 
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vm. 
ARGUMENT 
A. SCHWINN'S MENTAL ILLNESS DID NOT ARISE OUT OF AND IN THE 
COURSE OF HER EMPLOYMENT WITH HAL 
Under section 34A-3-106 of the Utah Occupational Disease Act, in order to qualify for 
workers compensation benefits, a physical, mental, or emotional disease must arise "out of and 
in the course of employment." The employee seeking benefits under this section must prove a 
sufficient legal and medical causal connection between the employee's disease and employment. 
Id. Legal causation is proved by showing the existence of extraordinary mental stress arising 
predominantly and directly from employment. Id- An employee alleging a compensable 
occupational disease as a result of mental stress must prove medical and legal causation by a 
preponderance. Id. Here, the administrative law judge ("ALP') reviewed all of the evidence, the 
Labor Commission Appeals Board ("Board") reviewed the record, and determined that Schwinn 
failed to prove that the HAI work environment, when compared to contemporary employment 
and nonemployment life, created extraordinary stress. R at 946-947 and 1065-1066. 
Application of § 34A-3-106 is a case of first impression for the Labor Commission and 
the Court of Appeals. However, prior to the 1995 amendment, mental stress claims were 
compensable under U.C.A. § 35-1-45 (Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid), and the 
compensability of such a claim was addressed in Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Utah 
App. 1992). In Stokes, the employee alleged mental stress as a result of disciplinary proceedings 
and retaliatory actions taken against her as a result of her denial of unwanted sexual advances 
and harassment by her supervisor. The ALJ found that the sexual harassment did not occur. The 
ALJ found that the disciplinary action taken against the employee was handled properly. 
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Finally, the ALJ determined that the employee failed to prove legal causation as required by 
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986). On appeal, the Court held that an 
abnormal reaction to normal events is not compensable where the abnormality is created by non-
work related incidents. Stokes at 61 citing to Cox v. Denny's Restaurants. 112 Idaho 321, 732 
P.2d 290, 294 (1987); SAIF v. Griffith. 66 Or.App. 709, 675 P.2d 1092, 1094, rev. denied 296 
Or. 638, 678 P.2d 739 (1984); McGarrah v. SAIF. 59 Or. App. 448, 651 P.2d 153 aff'd, 296 Or. 
T45, 675 P.2d 159, 171 (1983); Williams v. Western Elec. 178 N.H.. Super. 571, 429 A.2d 
1063, 1071 (1981). In Stokes, the court found no error in the ALJ's finding that the employee's 
perceptions of and reactions to these events (the alleged sexual harassment and the disciplinary 
procedures) were abnormal and thus failed to prove legal causation. Ici. at 62. 
Here, the ALJ found, as did the ALJ in Stokes, that the employee's reactions to the 
workplace were abnormal. Attachment A at 8 and R at 944. The ALJ found that the HAI 
workplace was not ideal. Id- HAI had normal personnel tensions, computer downtime, resource 
limitations and other related problems. Id. The ALJ found there was no evidence that personnel 
actions including disciplinary actions, work evaluations, criticism, promotion and other pay 
actions, among other necessary management activities, were conducted in anything other than 
good faith. Id. The ALJ determined that Schwinn failed to see the cause and effect between her 
actions or inaction, and management's reasonable actions in response. Id. 
The ALJ's conclusion that Schwinn had an abnormal reaction to the workplace 
environment is supported by the evidence, including Schwinn's own testimony and the testimony 
of her co-workers, supervisors and managers. The ALJ properly found that Schwinn failed to 
prove that her mental illness arose directly and predominantly from her employment. Therefore, 
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Schwinn failed to prove legal causation, a required element in her claim for workers* 
compensation benefits under U.C.A. 34A-3-106. 
B. SCHWINN FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
In order to upset the ALJ's findings, Schwinn must show that the findings are "not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." 
U.C.A. § 63-46b-16 (4)(g). Under the whole record test, the party challenging the findings must 
"marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, 
and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence." Intermountain Health v. Bd.. of Review. 839 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 
1992) quoting Accord Heinecke v. Department of Commerce. 810 P.2d 459, 464 & n. 7 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
Schwinn argues that the ALJ's Findings of Fact are not supported by the record. 
However, Schwinn fails to do anything more than identify the evidence that supports her 
position and fails to identify the evidence supporting the ALJ's findings and how her analysis is 
different between the factual findings and legal conclusions. By persistently arguing her own 
position without regard for the evidence supporting the ALJ's findings, Schwinn has failed to 
satisfy her obligation to marshal the evidence. Intermountain at 844. This Court should 
therefore decline to disturb the ALJ's findings which were ratified by the Board. 
IX. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of this case are not in dispute and the Commission's application of these facts 
to the law was reasonable. The Commission concluded that Schwinn failed to show that she 
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suffered extraordinary mental stress which arose predominantly and directly from her 
employment at HAI. Schwinn failed to marshal the evidence as required and therefore, the 
ALJ's findings should not be overturned. 
Based upon the foregoing, HAI asks this Court to affirm the Labor Commission's 
decision, and hold that Schwinn failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her 
mental stress claims were the result of extraordinary mental stress arising predominantly and 
directly from her employment with HAI. Whether this Court affirms the decision of the 
Commission or adopts the arguments made by HAI, either decision is supported by the law and 
facts of this case. 
DATED this l^fh day of September, 1998. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON 
Irad yC/Betebenner 
S. Brook Millard 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Aetna Life & Casualty Company dba Human 
Affairs International and Travelers Property & 
Casualty Company 
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06724-1267 
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Petitioner Pro Se 
Alan L. Hennebold 
The Labor Commission of Utah 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
SA-^J- ^4J 
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APPENDIX A 
SONNI SCHWINN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AETNA LIFE & CASUALTY INS. 
CO. dba HUMAN AFFAIRS INTER 
NATIONAL INC., 
Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah (now the 
Labor Commission), 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on 27 and 28 
June 1997. Said hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner was present and represented by Karen Peterson 
Beausoleil, Attorney at Law. 
The respondents were represented by Brad Betebenner and Brook Millard, 
Attorneys at Law. 
This is a claim by Sonni Schwinn (petitioner) for the occupational 
disease of mental stress resulting in mental and physical problems allegedly 
incurred beginning in June 1994 while working for the Aetna Life & Casualty 
Insurance Company doing business as Human Affairs International, Inc. 
(respondent). She claims that her mental problems were caused by "ongoing, 
conspired (sic), harrassment; continual, unjustified criticism & blame; would 
not provide equipment I needed to do job; assigned work that required OT, but 
wouldn't approve OT." She alleges that her work conditions caused her to ex-
perience "insomnia, diarrhea, anxiety attacks, extreme fatigue, nausea, no 
appetite, quivery (sic), back pain, heartburn, unable to enjoy anything." 
She has asked for medical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary 
total disability compensation (TTC) from July 7, 1996 to the present, tempo-
rary partial disability compensation (TPC), and interest. This case solely 
involves claimed mental stress with physical manifestations. 
OR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 961162 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
SONNI SCHWINN 
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An evidentiary hearing was held, during which oral and written evidence 
was presented. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was 
taken under advisement by the administrative law judge. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The petitioner was an employee of the respondent beginning in June 
1994 until her alleged mental stress and claimed associated mental and physi-
cal problems caused her to be off of work from July 7, 1996 to the present. 
She was born on March 9, 1934. At the time of her alleged mental stress, she 
was earning $27,500 per year, and was working 37.5 - 45 hours per week. She 
was not married and had no dependent children. 
2. On April 9, 1997, the petitioner filed a complaint and jury demand 
in the United States District Court, District of Utah, alleging that the 
respondent and certain of her supervisors had committed age discrimination, 
harassment, conspiracy, reprisal, constructive discharge, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Exhibit R-3. This case remained pending 
in the U.S. District Court at the time of the hearing in this workers7 
compensation case. The respondent moved to dismiss the instant workers' 
compensation claim based on the current statute U.C.A. Section 34A-3-106 
claiming that the statute does not allow a worker's compensation claim to be 
filed if other remedies are available, and such other remedies are sought in 
other forums. Dismissal of the petitioner's case was denied under this 
statute, but the law judge ordered that no matters material to the complaint 
filed in connection with U.S. District Court claims (age discrimination, 
harassment, conspiracy, reprisal, constructive discharge, and intentional 
infliction of emotional duress) would be allowed. The petitioner agreed with 
this ruling of the law judge, but the respondent objected that 
this ruling was not correct and that dismissal was the only remedy. 
3. The petitioner has no degree, but is an experienced journalist. Her 
last job before working for the respondent was as a free lance writer and re-
porter for the Herald & Tribune (Herald) in Heber City. She worked for the 
Herald for five years. Although the details of her termination are murky, it 
is clear that she was terminated, and she left this job under pressure and an 
assertion of insubordination. Additionally, it appears that the owner's 
wife thought that the petitioner was having an affair with the wife's husband. 
The petitioner reports that she was fired by the wife and that the reason she 
was given was, "I'm sick of kissing your a--!M Exhibit R-13. 
4. The petitioner has worked as a writer for 20 years doing part time 
work in radio and theater, among others. She was hired as an associate writer 
by the respondent (Eric). She was well aware of the requirements of the 
SONNI SCHWINN 
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position for which she was hired at the time she was tendered the position. 
She willingly and voluntarily accepted the position offered. All of the other 
proposal writers were classified at the higher level of writer. Eric her second 
level supervisor hired her in February 1994, and told her that she would be 
groomed to be a writer. She was very upset when he told her this because she 
believed that she had all the knowledge and expertise needed to be a writer. 
She began work in March 1994. The writers at the latter level in the employ 
of the respondent had degrees including in some cases degrees at the masters 
and doctorate level. Eric hired her because of her past experience even though 
she had no degree. 
5. The respondent is in the business of providing proposals for mental 
health software and other programs for businesses. The petitioner's job was 
to write or help write these proposals after doing some relevant research. 
The respondent wanted a generic writer for the less complex proposals. 
6. The petitioner was hired at the pay level of $25,000 per year. She 
was also disturbed at the level of pay given to her since she felt that 
she was entitled to more. It is fair to say that she unreasonably reacted by 
being upset at what she perceived to be slights by management against her from 
her very first day at work. It is also plain that little that was done by 
second level management was pleasing to her. She felt that Eric was 
incompetent, and although she initially liked Marsha her first level 
supervisor, she testified that later she believed Marsha to be deceitful. 
7. Significantly, petitioner felt that she was perfect, or at the least 
nearly perfect, in her proposal writing. She testified that she was aware of 
only a few typos (typographical errors) that could be attributed to her, and 
that she was never wrong, or had never made a mistake while working for the 
respondent except for the typos. She felt that she needed little or no 
training for her position. This attitude got her into trouble with her 
counterparts since she asserts that everyone argued with her. She felt that 
everyone's day to day attitude created problems for her since they reacted 
hostilely when she merely tried to point out the errors she believed they were 
creating. This was particularly trying for her since she testified she knew 
more about the job than any of the others who had advanced degrees and who had 
been doing the job for much longer periods of time than the petitioner. 
8. She did not like Eric. She intentionally tried to get him into trou-
ble. This came to his attention. She admitted that no one at the respondent 
was ever MmeanH to her including Eric. Although she claimed that Eric knew 
nothing about her work, he testified that he regularly received reports from 
the sales agents for whom her proposals were being done, and they often 
complained about the quality of her proposals. They accused the petitioner of 
SONNI SCHWINN 
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not doing what they wanted, and on six occasions, they told Eric that they did 
not want the petitioner assigned to do the proposals. Eric testified that he 
tried to work with her to correct the problems, and to win over the sales 
staff. Her view that her work was without blemish was challeged by Eric and 
Marsha. The petitioner's attitude did not allow her to see her own defects. 
Eric stated that the petitioner's work rambled, and often her writing was not 
related to the questions asked by the potential client or sales agent. Marsha 
concurred in this assessment. 
9. He related that the other writers had better understandings of the 
respondent's products. They also knew how to market those goods and services. 
Eric assigned Nancy another writer to mentor the petitioner. Nancy had a 
doctorate degree in English literature. The petitioner testified that this 
upset her to be assigned a mentor because she felt like a child. She also 
testified that Nancy did not know anything about English. 
10. The petitioner showed that she did not want to take constructive 
criticism from her supervisors. She argues that they did not know as much 
about writing as she did, and she argues that there was never any valid 
critique of her performance. Her view that she was superior to all the others 
in the department in terms of writing and performance ability tainted her 
attitude and caused her to react abnormally to normal workplace criticism and 
superivisor direction. Although her supervisors gave her direction, she re-
fused to accept it by claiming that it was not valid, and that it was not 
specific enough. 
11. She felt that her second level supervisor was not paying her 
sufficient wages nor had she been recognized for her superior performance and 
writing ability. She therefore asked for a promotion in late summer of 1994. 
Eric told her that she could not be promoted until she had been with the 
respondent for at least one year. She felt this pronouncement was wrong and 
was again upset. 
12. She was promoted to writer in the Spring of 1995. Eric gave her a 
rating of commendable on her performance review. Commendable means that she 
was doing her job well. Predictably, she was not pleased by this rating 
since she thought that she should have been given a superior rating. He 
informed her that effective April 10, 1995, she would receive an $800 per year 
raise to $25,800. He further stated in part: 
I would like to personally thank you for your hard 
work and success. I am very confident in [respondent's] 
ability to meet the challenges before us in 1995 and 
beyond. I look forward to working with you in achieving 
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our business objections. 
Exhibit R-5. 
13. She testified that she felt like she had been slapped in the face 
since she felt that she should have been given a much greater increase in pay. 
Eric testified that he was surprised by her reaction since she was the only 
employee who received a raise due to the constrained budget. The petitioner 
then protested the $800 raise by stopping work on two proprosals on which she 
was then working. 
14. To inform Eric of her displeasure about the commendable rating and 
$800 raise, she sent him an Email message which told him that she refused to 
do any more work on the two proposals until she received a much higher raise 
in pay. Her message said in pertinent part, M[I] will return to doing the work 
I was hired to do and will accept other assignments only if fair compensation 
accompanies them.w She returned the two proposal assignments to Marsha telling 
her that she (the petitioner) would not do the work. Exhibit R-7. 
15. Eric replied by sending her a warning about her unacceptable 
behavior on March 31, 1995. Exhibit R-7. The letter was a "One-Time Warning" 
telling her that her "behavior and failure to execute the basic components of 
[her] position [was] unacceptable." He further informed her, "As this is a 
one-time warning, any future insubordinate behavior or other occurrences of 
this nature will result in immediate termination." id. 
16. On January 4, 1996, she went to a psychiatric social worker (Barbara 
Belnap) for help with dealing with the death of a gang member who presented 
at her door after having been shot. The petitioner attempted to give him CPR, 
but he died. She had difficulty dealing with this event. There was no report 
by Ms. Belnap at the time and during this therapy that there was any problem 
at work. 
17. She was given an overall rating of adequate (just below commendable) 
on February 6, 1996 for the rating period of January 1995 to December 1995. 
Most of the subratings were adequate with one rating being commendable. 
Exhibit R-8. Eric reported a number of her strengths known as "strongest 
competencies" on the performance rating. He noted among other competencies 
that she was flexible. He reported that she had several weaknesses such as 
needing to learn to "rely more upon the folio infobase to generate proposal 
responses rather than to frequently defer to the SME network for assistance." 
The rating form requires the rater to provide primary objectives, strongest 
competencies, competencies to develop further, critical learning, and success 
to build on. These were all provided as required. Id. She took exception 
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to the ratings and narrative of her performance provided to her. 
18. On February 13, 1996, the petitioner reported to Ms. Belnap 
(counselor) that she had previously experienced problems with: 
Death of friend or family member; change in close 
personal relationship (Divorce, separation, break-
up); major legal difficulties; marriage; problem 
with friend/family member; family injury, illness, 
or accident; sexual harassment; sexual abuse, rape; 
major change in financial status; major geographi-
cal relocation; major change in employment status; 
serious job-related problems; new responsibility 
for elder parents; headaches; gynecological pro-
blems; sexual problems; anxiety or nervousness; 
backaches; stress; dizziness; sad, empty mood or 
pessimism; insomnia, sleep disturbance; decreased 
energy, severe fatigue; loss of pleasure, includ-
ing sex; suicidal thoughts or previous attempts. 
There was no accompanying statement as to when she had experienced these 
problems except that she testified that they occurred years ago and she mini-
mized their stressfulness in connection with the instant case. However, she 
also admitted receiving help for an emotional, or alcohol problem. MR 17. 
There was testimony that she had significant recent problems with her daughter, 
including the petitioner's failed marriages accompanied by abuse, and alcohol 
problems. 
19. On February 14, 1996, Marsha met with the petitioner to discuss a 
close call on meeting a proposal deadline (Navistar). She provided petitioner 
with some steps which petitioner needed to complete in meeting proposal 
deadlines. The petitioner testified that she was not responsible for the close 
call, and that she met the deadline. There was testimony that the deadline had 
to be extended because the proposal was not ready on time. It was also clear 
from the testimony that the petitioner felt that she was not at fault, and that 
it was either the computer or the others v»ho caused the problems. 
20. On February 15, 1996, the medical records first show that she 
reported having a work problem with her boss who she described as 
"controlling." MR 37. The medical records further stated that she feels she 
can no longer work with her supervisor. It states that she was working 
on a large project on which she worked 80 hours of overtime in three weeks, 
but that her supervisor was angry that the project took her so long. Except 
for short periods, there were not significant amounts of overtime required. 
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21. The petitioner and Eric had discussions about her performance on 
February 15, 1996, the date when she first went to see Ms. Belnap about work 
problems. There were additional discussions on April 10, 1996, and May 21, 
1996. She was placed on written warning on May 28, 1996 as a result of pro-
blems with the Navistar proposal. The May 28 written warning was described as 
the first step of the progressive discipline process. The written warning was 
for 30 days, beginning May 28, 1996 and ending June 26, 1996. She was pro-
vided with specifics as to her deficiencies as well as objectives to ensure 
satisfactory performance. Eric told her: 
1. 1 will meet with you weekly to determine 
progress and improvement. 
2. Marsha will provide you with timely feed-
back on each proposal you complete. 
3. Sales director feedback will be solicited 
to monitor for areas of improvement. 
Exhibit R-10. 
22. She was told that she would be removed from written warning if she 
met the terms of written warning, but if she did not, she would be placed on 
probation. She continued to have work related problems, improved only margi-
nally, and was placed on probation on June 28, 1996 by Eric. He informed her 
verbally as well as in writing of the specific areas of deficiency, and the 
performance required in order to be taken off of probation. He additionally 
informed her that if she did not improve, she would be terminated. She submit-
ted her resignation on Monday, July 8, 1996 after a period of absence. She was 
given two weeks of severance pay as well as for 12 vacation days she had 
accrued. His final written statement to her was, "I wish you well in your 
endeavors and hope you find the happiness in life you rightly deserve." 
Exhibit R-12. 
23. She complained that she was not told in what areas management had 
problems with her. She also stated that she had to work large amounts of 
overtime in order to complete projects, and often had computer problems which 
contributed to her having to work extra. The overtime was not excessive when 
the total period of time is viewed. The testimony showed that the most arduous 
period required, according to her testimony, 80 hours of overtime in a three 
week period. This is not excessive and 20+ extra hours per week would not 
place the respondent's work conditions in a category which is outside the 
national norm. The work place was an office, air conditioned and heated, and 
without the dirt and sweat found in an assembly line environment. 
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24. It is not abnormal for computers not to function due to being 
maintained, or to malfunction on occasion. None of the testimony showed that 
the work place placed any extraordinary mental stress on any of the writers. 
The work place was not ideal, and it had the normal personnel tensions, 
computer downtime, resource limitations, and other related problems. But, the 
evidence objectively viewed shows that the petitioner's reaction was abnormal 
from the beginning of her employment, and her attitude greatly skewed her per-
ception of management and fellow worker actions towards her. 
25. Performance reviews and employer criticism of employee performance is 
normal in the work place. There was no evidence that the personnel actions 
including disciplinary actions, work evaluations, criticism, promotion, and 
pay actions, among other necessary management activities, were conducted in 
other than good faith. The petitioner failed to see the cause and effect 
between her actions or inaction, and management's reasonable actions in 
response. It is found that the reaction of the petitioner to the work place 
situations presented were abnormal. In reaching this finding, the reports of 
both Dr. McCann and Dr. McCusker have been ignored since these reports were 
submitted on the issue of medical causation. 
26. The evidence shows that the requirement of the petitioner to show 
legal causation has not been met to a preponderance of the evidence. 
27. The petitioner admits that she is not temporarily and totally 
disabled. She stated the following to the Utah Department of Employment 
Security on February 10, 1997 when she returned all unemployment disability 
benefits from July 1996 to the date of her statement, "I have not given any 
fraudulent information to Job Service. I have been able to work and searching 
for work, as I have reported." She reported that the respondent was paying her 
short term disability benefits. She further said, "I could work for any 
company except my former employer." Exhibit R-15 (emphasis added). She also 
said that she was filing a lawsuit against the respondent and thought that she 
needed to leave her position. She stated, "I intend to terminate so that I can 
file my lawsuit." JJU Thus, could have continued to draw short term 
disability benefits, but she reasoned that termination was more consistent with 
her plans for a lawsuit. 
28. Dr. McCann psychiatrist hired by the respondent to examine the peti-
tioner found her to not be occupationally impaired, and to show very mini-
mal symptoms. Her own report showed marked improvement after she separated 
herself from the workplace. He reported, "The evidence is consistent with 
sufficient improvement that she should have been able to resume productive 
work within three months of leaving the [respondent's] workplace." MR 80P. 
He found her to have a "clear past history of psychiatric disorder." MR 800 
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He further found her to have a "lifelong pattern of trying to cope with 
stresses by escalating perfectionistic behaviors." She reported to him a 
"similar pattern of escalating herself into a state of extreme distress with 
perfectionistic and compulsive behaviors which led to a ten day period of 
psychiatric hospitalization in 1972." He related that her traits were not con-
sistent with "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or Acute Stress Disorder." He 
stated that the nature of the work experience which she described "appeared 
to be fairly common in corporate environments." Id. He reported that her 
past history of "dysfunctional stress response [resulted] in anxiety and de-
pression also contributed to an inability to cope with stress." He also found 
that the petitioner's stress related symptoms have essentially resolved, id. 
29. Dr. McCusker, Ph.D. practices school psychology. His report is 
primarily an attack on Dr. McCann without providing any substantive statements 
about the petitioner. Dr. McCusker reports that psychologists know much more 
about normal behavior and deviations that do psychiatrists. Dr. McCusker 
accuses Dr. McCann of pandering to the needs of the respondent rather than 
the petitioner, and the implication is that psychologists would not do so. 
Exhibit P-l. It is obvious that Dr. McCusker is relying on the statements of 
the petitioner about who is culpable in this case. It is interesting that he 
attacks Dr. McCann's alleged assumptions, but does not recognize that he 
(Dr. McCusker) relies on assumptions supplied by his training, experience, 
the petitioner and her attorney who is also a psychologist. Dr. McCusker 
states, for example, "[The petitioner] is the first girl (and first child) in 
her family constellation. First girls are normally perfectionistic " 
Exhibit P-l at 2. Further, Dr. McCusker baldly states that certain statements 
Dr. McCann attributes to the petitioner are lies (fabrications). Exhibit P-l 
at 5. This is a strong statement and is surprising in a document written by a 
professional especially since Dr. McCusker admittedly relied completely on the 
statements given to him by the petitioner, and presumably her attorney who is 
also a psychologist. Dr. McCusker does not apparently recognize that the 
the petitioner, and her attorney, in addition to the respondent, have a great 
interest in the potential compensation generated by the petitioner's claim. 
30. The petitioner has been observed for a number of days during the 
hearing. It is apparent that she has tailored her testimony to reflect her 
version of the events she has been trying to portray. She has changed her tes-
timony during the hearing whenever it suited her perceived case needs. As 
an example, she waffled and changed her testimony related to her termination 
from her previous employment. She claims that she was never stressed or at the 
most only minimally stressed prior to her work for the respondent. Yet her ten 
day psychiatric hospital stay, her daughter's problems, her marriage problems, 
as well as her other significant previous stresses must have affected her 
mental processes to some extent. She had to get treatment for the gang related 
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event. Shortly after this, she reported problems at work. To hear her tell 
it, the only stresses that she experienced were at work. She relates that the 
other stressors did not affect her. These reports defy reality, and the medi-
cal reports reflect otherwise. Her perception of events was based upon her 
view that she could do no wrong. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. The parties stipulated that this case is governed by Laws 1995, 
ch. 309 which became effective on May 1, 1995 currently codified in U.C.A. 
Section 34A-3-106. With regard to legal causation, this statute provides 
in relevant part: 
(1) Physical, mental or emotional diseases related 
to mental stress arising out of and in the course of 
employment shall be compensable under this chapter 
only when there is a sufficient legal and medical 
causal connection between the employee's disease and 
employment. 
(2)(a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary 
mental stress arising predominantly and directly from 
employment. 
(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental 
stress is judged according to an objective standard in 
comparison with contemporary national employment and 
nonemployment life. 
The statute in clear and unmistakable language requires a person alleging 
on the job mental stress to show that the workplace inflicted an unusual and 
extraordinary amount of stress which the ordinary, contemporary national 
workplace as well as nonemployment life would not have inflicted. 
To clarify the standards applicable to the work place, the legislature 
further noted: 
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including 
disciplinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, 
layoffs, demotions, promotions, terminations, or re-
tirements, may not form the basis of compensable men-
tal stress claims under this chapter. 
The term "good faith11 means that the employer cannot act with malice or an 
intention to deceive. See e.g. Webster's New World Dictionary. Third College 
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Edition (1988). The employer does not have to be perfect in management skills. 
The employer cannot intentionally seek to harm the employee either mentally or 
physically. He or she cannot act with some malevolent motive toward the 
employee or those actions would not be in good faith. Employer mistakes or 
failure to promote the ideal work environment do not necessarily connote bad 
faith. 
The statute also requires a comparison of the actual work place with that 
of an imaginary, contemporary national work place. This requirement may have 
its counterpart in the requirement for jurors to postulate the attributes of 
a "reasonable person." There is no expectation that the imaginary national 
work place would represent ideal or even near ideal working conditions. How-
ever, it does represent a work place where stressors are present in mild to 
moderate degree; where deadlines are required; where machines break down occa-
sionally; where supervisors and fellow employees may not be absolutely perfect; 
and where other normal workplace glitches may occur. The legislature 
recognized that stressors are present in both work and nonwork environments. 
In most cases, it is likely that the nonwork stressors are greater in many 
respects than in the working life. The legislature required a consideration 
of both in order to determine what might be unusual and extraordinary in the 
work place. 
The petitioner in this case was required to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence both legal causation and medical causation. It is concluded that she 
did not show legal causation to a preponderance. 
2. It is concluded that both physical and psychological injuries from 
mental stress are compensable under Utah law, however, an abnormal reaction to 
normal events is not compensable when the petitioner exhibits such towards 
good faith management actions which are objectively within the range and good 
faith competence of activities expected of management. Accord Stokes v. Bd. 
of Rev.. 832 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). There is therefore no basis for 
workers' compensation under U.C.A. Section 34A-3-103 et seq. 
3. Since the petitioner admits that she could work for any employer 
except her former employer during the period subsequent to and including 
July 1996, she was not temporarily and totally disabled under U.C.A. Section 
34A-2-410. 
4. There is no evidence of permanent partial disability under U.C.A. 
Section 34A-2-412. 
5. There is no need to send this case to a medical panel even assuming 
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a medical conflict because U.C.A. Section 34A-3-106 (stress statute) is a more 
recent statute than the medical panel statute U.C.A. Section 34A-2-601. The 
medical panel statute requires a referral to the medical panel if an 
occupational disease claim is filed. However, the more recent stress statute 
provides a great deal of detail about what to do if a stress claim is filed 
and requires first a finding of legal causation. There must be both findings 
of (1) legal and (2) medical causation for a connection to be made between 
the employee's disease and employment. It is clear that if legal causation 
is not found, the case is over. When legal causation is not found under U.C.A. 
Section 34A-3-106, the statute on medical panels would not even be consulted 
since it only becomes relevant under U.C.A. Section 34A-3-106 where legal 
causation is satisfied. 
6. Assuming that there is a requirement to send the case to a medical 
panel, Dr. McCusker's report does not create a medical conflict since he admits 
that he did not examine the petitioner with the intent to reach any conclusion 
about her circumstances at work. His report is essentially an attack on the 
training of Dr. McCann as well contains some unsupported and gratuitous slurs 
against Dr. McCann. In the Willardson case, Willardson used doctors who had 
reached conclusions about his medical condition although they did not have 
access to all of his medical records. In the instant case, Dr. McCusker who 
is a school psychologist does not provide much information about the peti-
tioner's mental condition, but attempts to impugn the motives and conclusions 
of Dr. McCann. Under the circumstances, assuming for argument sake that legal 
causation has been satisfied, no medical conflict has been shown. See 
Willardson v. Ind. Comm'n. 904 P.2d 671 (Utah 1995). 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of Sonni Schwinn for workers' 
compensation benefits based upon mental stress has not been shown to a 
preponderance that the mental stress was a normal reaction to and arose out 
of and in the course of her employment for Aetna Life & Casualty Co. dba Human 
Affairs International, and due to the failure to show legal causation, the 
claim must be dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have 15 days from the date of 
filing with the Commission, in which to file a written response 
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with the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(2). In case 
a Motion for Review is filed, it will be reviewed by the Commission of the 
Labor Commission unless a specific request in writing is made by the filing 
party to have the case reviewed by the Appeals Board. The opposing party 
to a Motion for Review has 20 days to file its request for action by the 
Appeals Board under U.C.A. Section 34A-2-801. 
DATED THIS j_2rday of December 1997. 
MAILING of Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
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APPENDIX B 
Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-16. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency 
action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate 
rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all 
additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except 
that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for 
the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, 
summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, 
is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making 
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by 
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute-, 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the inconsistency; or (iv) otherwise arbitrary or 
capricious. 
35-1-16. Powers and duties of commission - Fees, 
(1) The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to 
determine the facts and apply the law in this or any other title or chapter that it administers and 
to: 
(a) supervise every employment and place of employment and to administer 
and enforce all laws for the protection of the life, health, safety, and welfare of 
employees; 
(b) ascertain and fix reasonable standards, and prescribe, modify, and enforce 
reasonable orders, for the adoption of safety devices, safeguards, and other means or 
methods of protection, to be as nearly uniform as possible, as necessary to carry out all 
laws and lawful orders relative to the protection of the life, health, safety, and welfare of 
employees in employment and places of employment; 
(c) ascertain, fix, and order reasonable standards for the construction, repair, 
and maintenance of places of employment as shall make them safe; 
(d) investigate, ascertain, and determine reasonable classifications of persons, 
employments, and places of employment as necessary to carry out the purposes of this 
title; 
(e) promote the voluntary arbitration, medication, and conciliation of disputes 
between employers and employees; 
(f) establish and conduct free employment agencies, and license, supervise, 
and regulate private employment offices, and bring together employers seeking 
employees and working people seeking employment, and make known the opportunities 
for employment in this state; 
(g) collect, collate, and publish statistic and other information relating to 
employees, employers, employments, and places of employment and such other statistics 
as it considers proper; and 
(h) ascertain and adopt reasonable standards and rules, prescribe and enforce 
reasonable orders, and take such other actions as may be appropriate for the protection of 
life, health, safety, and welfare of all persons with respect to all prospects, tunnels, pits, 
banks, open cut working, quarries, strip mine operations, ore mills, and surface 
operations or any other mining operation, whether or not the relationship of employer and 
employee exists, but the commission may not assume jurisdiction or authority over 
adopted standards and regulations or perform any mining inspection or enforcement of 
mining rules and regulations so long as Utah's mining operations are governed by federal 
regulations. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the commission may adopt a schedule of 
fees assessed for services provided by the commission. The fee shall be reasonable and fair, and 
shall reflect the cost of services provided. Each fee established in this manner shall be submitted 
to and approved by the Legislature as part of the commission's annual appropriations request. 
The commission may not charge or collect any fee proposed in this manner without approval by 
the Legislature. Prior to submitting any proposed fee to the Legislature, the commission shall 
conduct a public hearing on the proposed fee. 
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